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Steven Thomason, Ph.D.
Aristotle’s Ideal Regime as Utopia
Presented at the
Southwest Political Science Conference, Las Vegas, March 2016
Abstract: Although Aristotle’s ideal regime discussed in books seven and eight of his
Politics seems much more feasible and less utopian than the regime outlined in Plato’s
Republic, a few scholars have questioned its feasiblity in light of the real world demands
of politics. Similarly, I argue that carefully considered his ideal regime turns-out not to
be feasible or a practical recommendation for politics, but rather a thought experiment
like Plato’s Republic meant to show the limitations of what is politically achievable. I do
so by comparing his ideal regime to his prior discussions of democracy in the earlier
books of the Politics and in particular what he considered the best type of democracy.
Scholars have indicated problems with Aristotle’s ideal regime discussed in books
seven and eight of his Politics. It requires conventional slavery, which Aristotle had
earlier argued is unjust. It seeks self-sufficiency but ultimately still needs other cities. It
is unclear whether it allows for philosophy, or how many, if any, of its citizens would be
philosophers. Due to such short-comings, some scholars have suggested that the city,
despite its seeming real plausibility compared to Plato’s Republic, is ultimately just as
utopian, i.e. very improbable that it could come into being and equally improbable that it
could be sustained very long if it did. Mary Nichols, for example, argues that “its full
flourishing is impossible” due largely to the unresolvable tension between political rule
and despotism.1
I will also argue that the city is a utopia. Despite the fact that Aristotle makes
more concessions to the practical demands of politics and necessity, when thought
through there are simply too many problems to make its sustainability plausible even in
the unlikely circumstance that it did come into being in the first place. Thus, like Plato’s
Republic, in the final analysis, it is a sort of thought experiment meant to show the
limitations of what can be achieved, or hoped for, in politics. I will make this argument
by comparing the ideal regime to Aristotle’s discussion of democracy, which, as far as I
am aware, no scholar has systematically undertaken. I think this is the best way to
approach the argument, because, in a sense, Aristotle’s ideal regime is an ideal
democracy. Also, although not pro-democratic per se, there is, arguably, a tacit
preference of a sort in the Politics for democracy of some kind despite its problems.
I will begin by saying something about Aristotle’s discussion of democracy in
general and then his explicit discussion of it in book six. Despite Aristotle’s subsequent
discussion of democracy in the Politics, his first explicit mention of it in book two does
not seem very favorable. There Athens does not come to light as one of the cities he
considers to be best governed at the present time. Surprisingly, the best governed city
turns out to be the barbarian city of Carthage, which does not much resemble a
democracy (1272b25-42).2 The other two well governed cities Aristotle discusses, Sparta
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It is also worth noting that unlike the other two cities mentioned, Sparta and Crete,
Carthage has no founder. Cf. Robert Bartlet, “Aristotle’s Science of the Best Regime,”
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and Crete, also are not very democratic. Consequently, the first impression we get is that
democracy is not a well governed regime. It is too volatile and susceptible of internal
change in contrast to Carthage, which merits his praise chiefly due to its stability.
However, is Aristotle’s reserve about Athens, his absence of praise, really a tacit criticism
of democracy as such? I do not think so.
Athens was an aristocratic democracy and not, at least by Aristotle’s day, what he
considered a healthy democracy. In fact, he later indicates that present day Athens is
what he understands as one of the least desirable types of democracy (1298b28ff).3
Athens was no longer the austere polis of Marathonian virtue, the city of Aeschylus’
youth. Owing to the advent of a formidable navy, the once austere city had become more
like the feverish city that Glaucon desires in Plato’s Republic (372e). Despite his
reticence about early Athens, the Athens that emerged after Solon’s innovations and
particularly after Peisistratus’ tyranny (Athenian Constitution XIII-XV), it is likely that
Aristotle’s judgment of that early Athens was favorable and very similar to the
democracy that he later describes as the best (1318b6).4
Aristotle next discusses democracy in book three in his discussion of citizenship.
What is a citizen is disputed from city to city: what is a citizen in a democracy will not be
the same as in an oligarchy (1275a4). Nonetheless, Aristotle goes on to seek the citizen
in an unqualified sense. He concludes, “The citizen, simply, is determined by no other
thing than having a share in decision and office (1275a22-24).”5 From this Aristotle
defines a citizen as those “for whom there is the means to have a share in a legislative
(bouleutikēs) office (1275b16-18).”6 In this way, Aristotle implies a first, tentative
definition of democracy: a regime in which all the citizens “have a share in legislative
office.”
Why would this tentative idea of a city, and form of government, be more just
than others? From the argument made in the opening of the Politics, it best fulfills our
political nature. What separates us from the rest of the animals, Aristotle argues, is our
capacity for reason/speech (logos) (1253a10-15). This capacity allows and facilitates
discussion of what is useful and harmful and just and unjust. Discussion and practice of
these things brings the polis into being. It is some sort of agreement about these things,
i.e. the just and the unjust, noble and shameful, etc., that makes a polis a polis as opposed
to simply an alliance of some sort (1280a31-37). Therefore, that polis is best which most
actualizes this potential in citizens: best or most just by nature, because it best completes
human nature. In order for there to be agreement, there must be discussion and
participation among the citizens. Therefore, democracy, of some kind, is the best type of
regime by nature.
American Political Science Review 88 (1994) and Leo Strauss, “On Plato’s Republic,” in
The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 52-53.
3
See Andrew Lintott, “Aristotle and Democracy,” Classical Quarterly (Great Britian,
1992), 120. Lintott also argues that the four forms of democracy discussed in bk6, ch4 of
the Politics are historical stages of Athenian democracy (124). Cf. Gerald Mara, “The
Culture of Democracy: Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia as Political Theory” in Aristotle
and Modern Politics (Indiana: University of Norte Dame Press, 2002), 311-312.
4
See Lintott 115.
5
This and all subsequent translations from the Greek are my own from Aristotlelis
Politica (Lipsiae : In aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1909).
6
Some manuscripts read: “legislative and judicial office”.
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Aristotle’s next remarks on democracy occur in book four in his analysis of
different types of regimes or what makes regimes differ. There he gives a delineation of
six pure or unmixed regimes: three good and three deviant. Now, it comes to light that
there are, in fact, two different types of democracy: one good, which promotes the
common good, and another which is deviant and seeks primarily the interest of the ruling
element. The correct (orthos) one Aristotle calls politeia and the deviant (parekbasis) is
called democracy (1289a28-30). Politeia is the Greek word for the form of a city, i.e.
regime or constitution.7 It makes sense to the extent that democracy is the form of
government that best fulfills the nature of what a city should be, as explained above, and
thus would have a name derived from polis: it has the greatest or fullest degree of
cityness (politeia) owing to the fact that all its citizens participate in the city and exercise
their capacity for reason (speech) and virtue.
Democracy, on the other hand, makes sense as the name of the deviant type.
Demos means people, but it can have a pejorative connation (and usually does for Plato
and Aristotle) so as to imply the rabble or hoi polloi. Kratia means power. Therefore,
“democracy” suggests rule by majority will or passion for partisan or self-interest as
opposed to deliberation about the common good. However, of the deviant types of
regimes, democracy, Aristotle argues, is the least bad or “most moderate” (1289b4). It is
the most stable of the deviant types, and also presumably the easiest to reform in the
direction of a good type of regime directed to the common good. Also, it is the least
removed from the good form of government of which it is the deviant. Consequently,
there is a fine line between the two and perhaps much easier to confuse the one for the
other than monarchy for despotism.
Aristotle turns to a detailed discussion of democracy in book six. Along with
oligarchy, democracy is the most extensively discussed type of regime in the Politics.
This would seem to be for a couple of reasons. First, as I have argued, some type of
democracy is the best sort of regime by nature. Second, as cities become larger they tend
to become more democratic. Aristotle doubts whether a very large city could be anything
but democratic for very long (1286b20-22). Finally, all actual democracies have some
element of oligarchy or hierarchy. A pure democracy is not practically workable.
Aristotle begins by noting three things that account for different types of
democracy. First and most important is the character of the people, e.g. whether it is a
farming community, seafaring community, ethnically homogenous or diverse population,
etc. (1317a23). Second, is the number and types of offices (1317a28). This has an
influence, but should not be unduly considered. It is the character of the multitude,
according to Aristotle, that by and large determines the types of offices and institutions
not the other way around even though citizens of democracies often confuse cause and
effect thinking that it is their constitution and institutions that make them a democracy.8
Finally, there is the degree to which it is a mixed regime, has characteristics of other
types of regimes, which is discussed at various places in the Politics.9 Aristotle discusses
mixed regimes at length, because most all actual regimes are mixed to some degree.
Also, mixed regimes are generally more stable than pure ones.
7

It is the Greek word used for the title of Plato’s Republic.
Michael Davis The Politics of Philosophy: A Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics
(Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 108-109.
9
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The type of multitude that makes for the best democracy is a farming multitude of
common language, ancestry, and ancient or long standing mores and tradition (1318b812). Common language and ancestry reduces faction, which is one of the chief dangers
in a democratic regime, and makes the citizens more inclined to identify with and care
about one another.10 This creates like-mindedness (homonoia), which Aristotle argues
should be a primary goal of legislators and statesmen in the Ethics (1155a25). Not only
does it reduce faction, but it is instrumental, if not essential, for directing citizens to the
common good as opposed to private distractions and self-interest.
Mores rooted in tradition are better than written constitutions (1287b4-6). They
are more likely to be followed, because they have been long engrained through
habituation and citizens do not even think of questioning them.11 Consequently, it is
often detrimental to change customs even if they are bad, because the power of custom
and law resides more in habit than reason.12
Farmers make good citizens for several reasons. First, they are rooted to the land
for their sustenance and therefore more dedicated to it than those who do not depend on
the land. This means they are more willing to fight and die for it. In the Ethics Aristotle
notes that mercenary soldiers are more skilled than militias. However, ultimately militias
taken from the citizens are better, because they are willing to stand their ground and die if
necessary in defense of their country whereas mercenaries run when it becomes clear that
they are losing and in danger (1116b15-23). Second, because they are rooted to the land
they are more mindful of their neighbors and the well-being of their community.
The work farmers do keeps them healthy and moderate (sophrosyne) (1318b1415). Farmers are relatively self-sufficient, not dependent on others for their livelihood,
but their way of life does not create much wealth (1318b12). This is advantageous
because it creates a sort of natural equality in terms of property, which is a condition
necessary for democracy. This remedies problems that occur from having to establish
and maintain equality, a middle class or middling element, through laws and
institutions.13
Thus, farmers are ruggedly independent, but not arrogant. They mind their own
business, but cannot be pushed around.14 Farming is time consuming and farms are
outside the city. This means farmers do not have much time for politics. They are
content with limited participation: voting and veto power of a sort (1318b20-21). This is
good for three reasons. First, it helps control factions. Idle hands are the devils
workshop. The more time people have to become politically active the more factions
develop in the city. Second, although most citizens will have the means for a degree of
liberal education, few have phronēsis (prudence or political wisdom), the virtue that
enables one to understand how to bring about the common good in different situations
(Ethics 1141b12-20). It is therefore good that most will not desire much share in office
and political power, since they will lack the skill to govern well. Finally, wealth tends to
translate into luxury and vice, which corrupt civic responsibilities. Aristotle remarks that
farmers, unlike many other professions, tend to enjoy their work (1318b14). This
10
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combined with the fact that they do not make much extra income makes them less likely
to adopt vices that are harmful to themselves and the city.
Finally, and this is the most subtle but arguably most important aspect of an
agrarian society: it is by nature politically moderate.15 Unlike occupations in cities,
farming is precarious. It is subject to nature and chance in ways that technical skills like
ship-building, shoe-making, and carpentry are not: the weather, the condition of the soil,
insects, disease, etc. This means farmers are less likely to be deluded or mislead by the
power of reason and technical know-how to control politics. They are more likely to
think of politics as an art like farming than an art like shoemaking, i.e. an art in which
human skill and reason exercise some influence, but there remains much beyond human
control unlike shoemaking where the artisan is in almost complete control of the product
from start to finish. In sum, men who have an intimate knowledge of the earth tend to
have far fewer illusions about man’s ability to control nature (both human and nonhuman) than those who “conquer” the world by means of manual craft or abstract
thought.
This means farmers are by their nature leery of change and more rooted in
tradition. Per Aristotle’s discussion of law, as mentioned, this is good, because laws and
political stability in general are largely due to habit and tradition. Innovation is
dangerous because it tends to disrupt mores.16 Further, Aristotle suggests that human
nature itself inclines us to desire change even when it is for the worse (Ethics 1154b2832). Because of the nature of freedom and power of the majority in democracies,
democracies are especially prone to change more so than other types of regimes. This
means the best democracy will be the one that is least prone to change by its nature and
does not need specific laws and institutions to try to limit and slow change, e.g. checks
and balances, separation of powers.
A second type of multitude that produces a good or stable democracy, but not
quite as good as farmers, is a ranching community. Ranchers have many of the same
virtues as farmers. For example, their work makes them particularly fit for military
service (1319a23-24) and does not incline them to the hubris of technical laborers.
However, it differs from farming in two respects. First, ranchers are not as rooted to the
land: ranching is like a moving farm (1256a34). Thus, they are not as tied to, therefore
concerned about, particular communities and neighbors. Second, ranching has more
potential to create wealth and therefore a greater tendency towards oligarchy. Horse
breeding is more characteristic of ranches, and owning horses is characteristic of
aristocrats. Extra wealth translates into luxuries, which erode virtue and result in
unnecessary and potentially detrimental (both to oneself and the city) vices.17 Further, as
mentioned, wealth tends to make citizens arrogant (Rhetoric 1384a3-7) and also gives
them more leisure to participate in politics as opposed to minding their own business like
farmers. Thus, large ranching communities tend to transform into oligarchies unless
there are laws and mores that inhibit this tendency.
15
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After discussing these two good or stable types of democracy, Aristotle discusses
two deviant forms of democracy. The first is a commercial multitude: the majority of
citizens no longer earn their living from farming but move to the city and become wageearners.18 This way of life loses the virtues of farming. First, the work is not as
intrinsically pleasant or satisfying as farming: Aristotle, to some extent, anticipates
Marx’s theory of alienation of labor. Second, their labor is not as time consuming as
farming and there is potential for greater profit. These factors make them more likely to
adopt vices: they have the extra time, money, and are looking for distractions from their
work, which they have easy access to because they live in the city. This makes them
more intrinsically restless.
Combine this with the fact that most will engage in technical professions that lack
the moderation of farming. They will be more inclined to believe in progress, since
technical skills are always advancing. Consequently, they tend to believe similar
progress can be made in politics, that human reason and ingenuity can control politics
beyond what may be prudent and practically feasible: city dwellers are politically
progressive, more inclined and eager for change. This progressive demeanor has a
tendency to overturn mores and lead to the final type of democracy. However, as long as
mores remain relatively unchanged and the population of a common language and
ancestry, there will still be some sense of a common good and devotion to it.
Nonetheless, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to stop a commercial democracy
from changing into what Aristotle calls a final or ultimate democracy, which is the most
precarious or unstable type (1319b1-30), in the long run. This occurs due to the
increasing population of a commercial democracy and the continual demand for greater
profits and more affluence. This stems from the nature of commercial democracy itself,
as mentioned, i.e. a way of life that is not intrinsically pleasant pursued as a means to an
end, not a way of life or end in itself. Citizens seek fulfillment in recreation, which
requires more and more money. Citizenry expands to include foreigners as new markets
are sought for goods. Requirements for citizenship are lowered to admit more and more
people (1319b8-10). At the extreme, the criterion of citizenship breaks down, foreigners
and natives alike are given equal rights.19
The population becomes more diverse, which creates more faction and eventually
dissolves a sense of common good. Rapidly changing mores disrupt civic responsibility
and family life. There is no longer order in the household (1319b28-29). Eventually, the
native population declines, because citizens forego having children to spend their money
on themselves.20 Aristotle goes so far as to describe this final type of democracy as a
tyranny (1292a17-18).21 Let me turn now to Aristotle’s ideal regime and see how it
compares with what he has said about democracy.

18

Arguably, this is the transition America made in the 1920s, e.g. the restlessness and
agitation of bourgeois life depicted in Lewis Sinclair’s Babbit. Cf. de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America “Why the Americans Show Themselves So Restive in the Midst
of Their Well-Being” (Vol. 2, Sec 2, Ch13).
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Cf. Republic 563c-d.
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Cf. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Bk36.
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Cf. de Tocqueville’s description of the Tyranny of the Majority, Democracy in
America Vol.2, pt.4, sec.6-7.
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It is debatable whether “the regime we would pray for”, or Aristotle’s best city,
discussed in books seven and eight is more like a democracy or an aristocracy. On the
one hand, citizenship is very restricted. On the other hand, all the citizens do take turns
ruling and being ruled. Scholars considering it an aristocracy point to the restricted
nature of citizenship and the city’s dependence upon servants and skilled laborers
(banausoi) who are not themselves citizens.22 However, by Aristotle’s own definition of
democracy, it nonetheless is principally democratic, since the servants are not technically
part of the city. Further, regardless of wealth or family lineage “all citizens have the
same chance of being allotted high or low office.”23
Nonetheless, despite its democratic features, it is at first surprising how different
it is from the best type of democracy discussed in book six. Yet, when carefully
compared to the farming democracy, I think it proves to be more similar to it than other
types of regimes Aristotle discussed. Still, by considering how different it is, we see its
problems and ultimate unfeasibility.
In a sense Aristotle accentuates the positive features of the farming democracy
and seems, at first, to negate the negative aspects by making it aristocratic. All citizens
are exempted from toil so as to devote themselves wholly to moral virtue, the condition
and character necessary for ruling and being ruled in turn. The virtues that a farming way
of life instilled in citizens are replaced by a rigorous civic education with great attention
and emphasis given to the liberal arts, particularly music.24 This substitution has two
goals. In part, the intention of this education is greater homonoia (like-mindedness),
which Aristotle says in the Ethics should be the chief goal of legislators, than that which
farming brought about. This homonoia goes beyond the sake of the necessary: reducing
faction and maintaining regime stability. It seeks, rather, to reconcile, as much as is
possible at any rate, the tension between the private good and the public good, the good
of the city and good of the individual. Consequently, this city will be more socialist than
the farming democracy. While still owning private property, they will largely share it
with each other, something made easier since the citizens in general will be wealthier and
less needy than the farmers of a farming democracy. The ideal regime seeks much more
than the agrarian democracy to make the good person and good citizen one and the same,
since, as Davis argues, “Good farmers do not make good men”, despite what virtues they
have.
The second and more important goal is to introduce an element of contemplative
virtue in the form of music and poetry, which was absent from the farming life. This
seems to be the main problem with farming and the farming democracy if one considers
it in light of the Nicomachean Ethics: it did not allow the leisure and wealth necessary for
the contemplative life, philosophy in particular, Aristotle concludes is the best at the end
of the Nicomachean Ethics. Philosophy and the contemplative arts come to fruition in
commercial, Periclean Athens.
22

Thanassis Samaras, for example, argues that it is a “clear-cut aristocracy”. “The Best
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 34.
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Richard Kraut Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),
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tragic poetry.
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The problem, however, is that the contemplative life, particularly the life of the
philosopher, is not simply compatible, but, in fact, somewhat at odds, with the life
devoted to the good of the city and civic duty, a problem that comes starkly to light in the
Republic when Glaucon baulks that it is most unjust to force the philosophers, the best of
the citizens, to go back into the cave and rule (519d). The virtue of the philosopher or the
virtue that constitutes the most happy life is not explicitly political but more of a private
nature. It is the more or less solitary activity of contemplation, shared, perhaps, with a
few friends, that characterizes the best or most choice-worthy way of life, not the busy
and tumultuous life of the politician.
Why, then, would it be good that the citizens participate in politics aside from the
necessity of having to do so like the philosopher-kings of Plato’s Republic who must take
turns doing so but will spend most of their time philosophizing (520d)? I think there are
two reasons. First, Aristotle, like Plato, recognizes that there are innately different
capacities and dispositions, which is reflected in the Noble Lie in Plato’s Republic.
Consequently, not all citizens will be equally capable and satisfied by the solitary,
contemplative life that Aristotle concludes is the best in the Ethics. Nonetheless,
Aristotle still seems to think it is the best way of life to the degree it is pursued even in
mitigated form. Participating in the legislative process, since it is a contemplative
activity of a sort, does give a share of the best way of life to all the citizens to some
extent. It makes them more inclined to at least one form of contemplation, aside from
music, than they would otherwise engage in if left to live simply as they please.
Also, this particular sort of contemplative activity is good for them and the city.
It is good for them, because it forces them, to a degree, to think beyond mere self-interest.
They must consider what is good for the community as a whole, albeit as it relates to their
own good, an act which in itself fosters moderation and self-restraint in the same way that
constructing a city in speech in Plato’s Republic moderates Glaucon’s personal and
private sensual desires for material goods and tyranny. This, in turn, is also good for the
city, because it fosters a citizen body that is more moderate and inclined to restrain their
private concerns and self-interest for the sake of the common good.
Second, the city as a city simply cannot foster exclusively, or even primarily, the
highest sort of contemplative, solitary activity, which is revealed to be the most choiceworthy way of life at the end of the Ethics. Its well-being and very existence depends
upon more mundane, utilitarian forms of planning and contemplation, those that require
discussion, cooperation, and compromise with other citizens. At any rate, this, I would
suggest, is why philosophy is not explicitly mentioned in books seven and eight. Rather,
contemplative virtue must be introduced in a diluted form that is politically salutary, i.e.
will not disrupt but can contribute, to a degree, to civic virtue and more egalitarian in
nature than philosophy. This turns-outs to be music and poetry, particularly epic poetry
about heroes and civic virtue.
This sort of leisure activity, watching tragedies and listening to music excites
certain passions and performs a cathartic function: it dispels passions, to an extent, that
are disruptive to the household and city, e.g. anger, pity, fear, jealousy. This is of great
importance because the leisure the citizens have creates much more opportunity for
faction and turmoil, opportunity that the farmers did not have because they were too busy
working. Thus, the elimination of work, while granting the opportunity for more
education and greater commitment to virtue and the common good also creates conflict
with it: more leisure and resources make the citizens more likely to realize and
distinguish between their own good and good of the city, a problem that was suppressed
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in the farming community due to the necessity forced upon them by meager means, i.e.
the necessity of depending and looking to the good of the city and the lack of time to
consider the tension between their private good and the public. Thus, music attempts to
be the remedy of the problem caused by leisure and is in that sense its purpose. Davis
remarks, “Music, then, keeps us from breaking up the home; it substitutes simulated
motion [war, domestic strife, etc.] for real motion.”25
Despite the dangers of leisure, it does allow the possibility of the philosophic life
for the few suited and inclined to it by nature. Consequently, in a sense Kraut, in
contradistinction to other commentators, is correct that the ultimate goal of the best
regime is the philosophic life.26 However, Kraut thinks that equates to the life of the
intellectual as opposed to philosopher in the strict sense of the word. That, I think, is
precisely the problem: a few, if not most, will not be satisfied with the life of the
intellectual: their leisure will disrupt and ultimately destroy the city. It is in this sense, I
think, that it is the regime we would pray for, i.e. it is doubtful that music can really
successfully fulfill this function: leisure will probably end-up destroying the city.
This becomes clear when comparing it more closely to the farmers. First, these
citizens will not be as naturally politically moderate as the farmers and thus more inclined
to change and innovation. While they will not be as susceptible to the illusion that
technical skill can conquer chance and nature as craftsmen who practice it every day,
they nonetheless will not work with and be subject to the vagaries of nature the way
farmers will. Second, and more important, although their education is liberal, it is not
effeminizing like modern liberal education: these citizens are not modern men. It must
emphasize, both in physical training and music, martial virtues due to the political
necessities of the ancient world, i.e. constant threat of war. The music will emphasize
epic poetry and heroic deeds: there is no mention of the extensive revision of Homer
made in the Republic, and even there philosophers do not really reduce the emphasis on
martial virtues. The army must be a citizen militia, and because the city cannot or should
not be very large, they must be formidable fighters like the Spartans.
Thus, it is no surprise that in Aristotle’s discussion of the three correct and three
deviant regimes in the Ethics the counterpart of democracy, the good democracy, he calls
not a politeia, as he does in the Politics, but a timocracy (1160a35). Timos means honor.
Therefore timocracy is a regime whose guiding principle is the pursuit of honor. In other
words, the best democracy is a democracy whose chief principle is not freedom, but
rather where freedom is subordinated to the higher principle of honor. Why honor and
not virtue? Because honor is an easier, more egalitarian and thereby more achievable
public substitute for virtue. The citizens of the best regime are not philosophers, but
music loving soldiers. Virtue is more difficult to cultivate and more difficult to judge.
Honor as a principle requires mainly just military virtue, which is easier to achieve. Also,
it mitigates against the negative undercurrents that cause democracy to become a deviant
form of government, e.g. fear (military training cultivates courage) and materialism
(soldiers lead austere lives, learn to do without material comforts, and somewhat look
down upon them as unmanly and effeminate).
However, there are problems with timocracy. For one, as we see in Sparta, it is
hostile to philosophy and holds no place for the contemplative virtue that must in some
sense characterize the best regime. More importantly, it is expansionist: you gain honor
25
26

135.
199.
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by valor and conquest in battle. Thus, the young citizens, especially, will push for war
and expansion even given the potential loss of property, since all citizens must own
property on the outskirts. Further, although Aristotle wants to make the city independent
of others as much as possible, he, nonetheless, chooses to locate it near the sea so as to
have a port and all the advantages of maritime trade of which wealth would be one.
Thus, the city will not really be independent in the final analysis, but must deal with other
cities and face the question, sooner or later, of whether to rule or be ruled by them, as
Sparta and Athens had to. Finally, the leisure their wealth and servant population gives
them, will make them restless, especially the young, and their music education cannot
help but heighten their desire for battle, again especially in the young, who will have
more leisure, presumably, because they will not have the political duties of their elders.
In fact, on-going conflict and periodic battle of some kind may be necessary to restrict
leisure. This becomes clearer by examining its precondition: freedom.
Freedom is understood by Aristotle in two ways, because there are two different
types of freedom in popular regimes. “One freedom is having a share in ruling and being
ruled (1317b1).” It is the freedom to hold an office and to have a say in the affairs of the
city, which is an essential part of being a citizen in the best regime. Another meaning of
freedom is “to live as one wishes” (1317b12). The first type of freedom is a condition
that facilitates cultivating and practicing moral virtue. The second type of freedom is
desirable for the leisure necessary for the contemplative life outlined in book ten of the
Ethics, but otherwise dangerous and potentially disruptive. Given the choice, i.e.
freedom to live as one wants, few will pursue virtue, as Aristotle argues at the end of the
Ethics and Socrates makes explicit in his critique of democracy in book eight of the
Republic. Hence, these two types of freedom are actually at odds with each other: civic
duty is not the same as living as one wants. When the second type of freedom becomes
more important than the first, civic duties are neglected and liberty degenerates into
license: politeia becomes democracy. It is unlikely that their liberal education will help
much in preventing this for two reasons: the citizens are not philosophers or even
intellectuals, as Kraut argues, but primarily soldiers. Consequently, the education is not
pleasant for them, per se, as it seems learning and philosophy in particular are for the
potential philosophers in Plato’s Republic. Some, if not most, will prefer physical
exercise, and the excitement and potential honors of war.
For all these reasons, Aristotle’s ideal regime seems unworkable in practice.
When he says it is the regime we would pray for, he means not that it could actually exist,
but that it could not, which is why divine intervention would be necessary to make it
work. And, yet, if I, and other scholars who argue along similar lines, am correct in
thinking Aristotle does not really believe his ideal regime could exist, as Kraut and others
think, why is he not more clear about it, like Socrates in the Republic who ultimately
admits that it does not matter that the kalipolis could not exist on earth, but “there is a
pattern for it laid in heaven” that the philosopher lives by.
Here, I can only suggest that I think Aristotle leaves open the hope that a better
regime can exist, because hope is necessary for all political reform for the better. Just as
the city needs courageous soldiers to defend it, and thus must to some extent promote the
illusory honors of war, so it needs courageous statesmen who work for reforming bad
regimes and maintaining good ones, or good elements of existing regimes. Not every
citizen can or should be made aware of the ultimately unsatisfying, not to say tragic,
nature of politics and political action in this world in the final analysis.
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Thus, I have argued that Aristotle’s ideal regime is a utopia (ou topia), something
that can literally not exist. Despite the fact that it seems quite a bit more plausible than
Plato’s Republic, in the final analysis, it too shows the limitations and tragic nature of
politics: the impossibility of resolving the tension between the individual good and good
of the city and the demands of justice in this world. This came to light by considering
Aristotle’s prior discussion of democracy in the Politics, since a popular government of a
type, as I have argued, is the best by nature, and the ideal regime is a democracy of a
type. In particular, by comparing his ideal regime with what he considered the best sort
of democracy, the agrarian democracy, we have seen how the ideal regime attempts to
correct the short comings of the farming democracy by introducing wealth, a servant
population, and thereby leisure and liberal education, which in turn allow for greater
homonoia and opportunity for the contemplative life.
Yet, when examined these improvements undermine the regimes’ stability and
feasibility. Their wealth and lack of work with nature and the earth will make them more
restless, arrogant, and immoderate. Their liberal education cannot help but entice them
into war and the potential honors that go along with it. In fact, war may be necessary,
and therefore expansion and empire, simply to prevent being ruled by another city and
more importantly to prevent freedom from degenerating into license and neglect of civic
duty and the common good. It is too much to ask of their liberal education that all or
most of the citizens will use their leisure well, i.e. for peaceful, contemplative pursuits as
opposed to directing it toward internal or external conflict, internally would be pushing
for ever more freedom, a chief characteristic of democracy in Socrates’ critique of it in
book eight of the Republic, and creating factions. Thus, the regime must be one we
would pray for, because it could never exist by chance, nature, or reason, but would
require divine intervention, a change in human nature or the natural condition of men.
Bibliography
Barnes, Jonathan. 2005. “Aristotle and Political Liberty” in Aristotle’s Politics: Critical
Essays. Ed. Richard Kraut, Steven Skultety. Rowman & Littlefield: New York.
Bartlett, Robert. 1994. “Aristotle’s Science of the Best Regime.” American Political
Science Review 88: 143-155.
Chambers, Mortimer. 1961. “Aristotle’s ‘Forms of Democracy’.” Transactions of the
American Philological Association 92: 20-36.
Coby, Patrick. “Aristotle’s Three Cities and the Problem of Faction,” Journal of Politics,
Vol.50, No. 4, 1988.
Davis, Michael. 1996. The Politics of Philosophy: A Commentary on Aristotle’s
Politics. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Holmes, Stephen. 1979. “Aristippus in and out of Athens.” American Political Science
Review 73:113-128.
Kraut, Richard. 2002. Aristotle Political Philosophy (Founders of Modern Political and
Social Thought). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lindsay, Thomas. 1992. “Aristotle’s Qualified Defense of Democracy through ‘Political
Mixing’.” Journal of Politics 54: 101-119.
Lindsay, Thomas. 1992. “Liberty, Equality, Power: Aristotle’s Critique of the
Democratic ‘Presupposition’.” American Journal of Political Science 36:
743-761.

12
Lintott, Andrew. 1992. “Aristotle and Democracy.” Classical Quarterly (Great Britain)
42: 114-128.
Mara, Gerald. 2002. “The Culture of Democracy: Aristotle’s Athēnaiōn Politeia as
Political Theory” in Aristotle and Modern Politics. Indiana: University of
Norte Dame Press.
Ober, Josiah. 2005. “Aristotle’s Natural Democracy” in Aristotle’s Politics: Critical
Essays. Ed. Richard Kraut, Steven Skultety. Rowman & Littlefield: New York.
Ober, Josiah. The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and
Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Pangle, Thomas. Aristotle’s Teaching in the “Politics”. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2013.
Salkever, Stephen. 1994. Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political
Philosophy. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Strauss, Leo. 1964. “On Aristotle’s Politics” in The City and Man. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Strauss, Leo. 1964. “On Plato’s Republic” in The City and Man. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Tessitore, Aristide. 2002. “Introduction: The Renaissance in Aristotelian Studies and
the Persistence of Political Philosophy” in Aristotle and Modern Politics.
Indiana: University of Norte Dame Press.

